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CommentaryNeuroethics for the New Millenium
introduction of a new area of intellectual and social dis-Adina Roskies
course.Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
As I see it, there are two main divisions of neuroethics:Massachusetts Institute of Technology
the ethics of neuroscience and the neuroscience of eth-Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139
ics. Each of these can be pursued independently to a
large extent, but perhaps most intriguing is to contem-
plate how progress in each will affect the other.The past several months have seen heightened interest
The Ethics of Neurosciencein the intersection of ethics and neuroscience. In the
The ethics of neuroscience can be roughly subdividedpopular press, the topic grabbed headlines in a May
into two groups of issues: (1) the ethical issues andissue of The Economist (2002) and was featured in a
considerations that should be raised in the course ofNew York Times editorial (Safire, 2002). Professional
designing and executing neuroscientific studies and (2)societies were a step ahead, staging several meetings
evaluation of the ethical and social impact that the re-devoted to ethics and neuroscience since the beginning
sults of those studies might have, or ought to have, onof this year. In January 2002, Neuron and the AAAS
existing social, ethical, and legal structures. Let me call,sponsored a symposium entitled “Understanding the
for convenience, the first the “ethics of practice,” andNeural Basis of Complex Behaviors: The Implications
the second the “ethical implications of neuroscience.”for Science and Society,” which brought together a
For the most part, the ethics of practice is where tradi-panel with expertise in the neurosciences, policy, ethics,
tional bioethics, as applied to neuroscience, resides. Itand the law to discuss the recent advances in the neuro-
includes familiar issues like optimal clinical trial design,sciences and their potential implications for science and
guidelines for use of fetal tissues or stem cells or cloning,society. The Royal Institution in London sponsored
privacy rights to results of testing for neurological dis-“Neuroscience Future” in March (see conference sum-
ease, and so on. However, the ethics of practice includesmary by J. Waldbauer on NMTF conference website
some questions peculiar to neuroethics. For instance,[URL below]), and in May the Dana Foundation, in collab-
in a liberal democratic society such as ours self-determi-oration with Stanford University and UCSF, sponsored
nation is highly prized, and hence the importance ofa conference boldly entitled “Neuroethics: Mapping the
informed consent is central to medical practice andField” (NMTF). The name “neuroethics” implies such a
medical ethics. But neurodegenerative diseases andfield exists, an “unexplored continent lying between the
psychiatric disorders may impair cognition so that in-two populated shores of ethics and of neuroscience,”
formed consent, as generally conceived, may be impos-in the words of Al Jonsen, an organizer of the NMTF
sible. What guidelines should be in place for treatmentconference.
or experimental participation in these cases? We alsoMy aim here is to delineate what I see as the basic
take it for granted that when making medical decisions,structure of this nascent field and to lay out some of
patients will choose what is in their best interests. Somethe fundamental questions with which it is concerned.
disorders of brain chemistry, such as depression, defyThe views here have been informed by the presentations
such an assumption. Who should wield executive powerand discussions of numerous people who participated in
when the subject cannot be counted on to choose whatthese conferences, but also strongly reflect my personal
is best for his or herself?
persepective on what the field of neuroethics should be.
The second subdivision of the ethics of neuroscience,
It is evident that neuroethics will overlap substantially
the “ethical implications of neuroscience” is the area of
with traditional issues in biomedical ethics. For instance, neuroethics that is truly novel, and perhaps the most
much of the recent work in ethics spurred by the Human ripe for advancement. Its aim is to investigate the impli-
Genome Project will be applicable, with perhaps slight cations of our mechanistic understanding of brain func-
modification, to some neuroethical problems. But if tion for society, and it will require integrating neuro-
there is to be justification for identifying and promoting scientific knowledge with ethical and social thought.
neuroethics as a new and important field, it ought not Advances in neuroscience have the potential to create,
be merely a subdivision of bioethics, with issues and and to remedy, serious social inequities. How we use
answers parallel to those that arise in other areas of our knowledge will shape our society. How, as we learn
biomedical research. The intimate connection between more and more about how the brain controls behavior
our brains and our behaviors, as well as the peculiar and the causes of mental dysfunction, are we to recon-
relationship between our brains and our selves, gener- cile this new knowledge with the social structures that
ate distinctive questions that beg for the interplay be- allow our society to run more or less smoothly? For
tween ethical and neuroscientific thinking. The moti- instance, it has been suggested that a large proportion
vation for the newfound interest in bringing together of inmates on death row may have damaged or injured
neuroscientists, ethicists, journalists, philosophers, and brains. If careful epidemiologic studies establish that
policy makers arises from the intuition that our ever- this is the case, how should our views about moral and
increasing understanding of the brain mechanisms un- legal responsibility change, if at all, to accommodate
derlying diverse behaviors has unique and potentially this surprising fact? In the future (but not currently!), it
dramatic implications for our perspective on ethics and may be possible to use noninvasive imaging techniques
to determine whether a person is lying. There is somefor social justice. These are the issues that warrant the
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indication that such imaging technology could be used profound implications for the way ethics, writ large, is
approached in the 21st century.to distinguish real from false memories. Perhaps even
further in the future we could, with some degree of cer- Already there are signs of a surge in interest in investi-
gating the brain bases of moral cognition, and suchtainty, diagnose behavioral dispositions, motivations, or
beliefs. In what cases can such information be used studies are bound to burgeon in the coming years. How
are decisions made in the brain? How are values repre-ethically? What are the privacy issues associated with
thought? What are the consequences of reliable, but sented? How are ethical decisions similar to or different
from other types of decisions? Many thinkers have as-not perfect, diagnostic techniques? If someone knows
that he or she is at some risk for, for example, a psychotic sumed ethical reasoning to be a variety of rational
thought. But recent evidence suggests that emotionsepisode, should he or she be held legally responsible
for actions undertaken while delusional in virtue of not play a central role in moral cognition (Damasio, 1995;
Greene et al., 2001). Does this undermine the view ofhaving prevented the episode? How should decision-
making proceed in the face of probabilistic predictions ethics as rational or instead undermine the long-cher-
ished division between reason and emotion? How willof behavior? Will the results of some predictive studies
become self-fulfilling prophecies? Once our technology a better understanding of the biological basis of moral
cognition and behavior modify our philosophical ethicalprovides us access to the full spectrum of physiological
states underlying behavior, will our common practice of framework? How will it affect ingrained notions of ratio-
nality and its importance to human existence?identifying certain behaviors as normal or abnormal have
meaning? Will our knowledge prompt us to redefine Many of us overtly or covertly believe in a kind of
“neuroessentialism,” that our brains define who we are,what “normal” is? Such issues will undoubtedly arise as
our technology and understanding of human cognition even more than do our genes. So in investigating the
brain, we investigate the self. What is the neural repre-improves, and it would be well to have thought them
through before we are faced with them in the flesh. sentation of “self” dependent upon? Is personal identity
a brain-based notion? What consequences for our con-It is easy to see how consideration of the ethical impli-
cations of neuroscience will affect issues generally cepts of personal identity will alterations of the self-
defining parts of us have? Some current interventionsthought to be in the realm of the ethics of practice.
Criteria for life and death are currently linked to gross (and undoubtably more in the future) will be such as
to perhaps improve the health and functioning of thegeneralizations about brain function. Better understand-
ing of developmental and cognitive processes may allow patient, but perhaps at the expense of altering the brain
chemically or mechanically. Will certain medical or tech-us to refine these notions to better identify life and death,
biological benchmarks important for a number of policy- nological therapies change who we are? What are the
ethical implications of such changes? Will we have torelated issues such as abortion, termination of support,
etc. Other definitions are extremely relevant to the daily weigh the costs of biological death against continued
life but destruction of our selves? Advances in neuro-lives of many: what is considered a disability, what will
insurance pay for? As we understand more fully the scientific research in relevant areas may change the
very fabric of our philosophical outlook on life.varieties of ways in which brains operate, it will be an
increasing challenge to define these terms in a way Although neuroscience is unlikely to answer meta-
physical questions about determinism, it can certainlythat does not marginalize, but nonetheless protects, the
disabled, the at-risk, and the disenfranchised. At the alter our perceptions of them. As our predictive grasp
of complex behavior improves, how will the bolsteredsame time, we need to be aware of the risk of overex-
tending these concepts and of mitigating diversity sense of the brain as a deterministic machine affect or
undermine our notions of free will or of moral responsibil-through medication. The pharmaceutical advances that
will surely stem from neuroscientific ones will present ity? Is self-determination, a driving concept in today’s
bioethics, merely an unscientific fiction? If not, what isthe following question: when can drugs be ethically used
to enhance normal capacities, rather than to just treat the biological basis for it, and if so, what notions should
replace it? What brain structures are essential to self-deficits? What effect will our policies have on existing
social and economic disparities? How can regulations control? How, and to what extent, can the role for self-
control in ethical and legal thought be reconciled withbe enacted to promote fairness and equality? What
might the consequences for our society or another be facts about mental illness or brain dysfunction? Even
now, we have evidence from imaging studies that ourif we fail to safeguard fair and equitable access to such
enhancements? We will also have to come to terms with brains respond selectively to race (Phelps, 2001). Are
we seeing activity related to social, or merely perceptual,the charge that chemical and technological enhance-
ments make us less human or “post-human” (Fukuyama, judgment? Are differences innate or learned? Will the
biologizing of the moral undermine its status as moral?2002) and perhaps revisit the question of what it is to
be human. It is clear here that there are a multitude of questions
and few answers. We may not even have a sense ofThe Neuroscience of Ethics
The second major division I highlighted is the neurosci- what an answer to such questions would look like. Nev-
ertheless, it is clear that as such questions are ap-ence of ethics. Traditional ethical theory has centered
on philosophical notions such as free-will, self-control, proached scientifically, the answers we get will shape
our ethical views and, thus, will affect how we approachpersonal identity, and intention. These notions can be
investigated from the perspective of brain function. Al- the ethics of neuroscience. As we learn more about the
neuroscientific basis of ethical reasoning, as well asthough the neuroscience of ethics today is far less devel-
oped than the ethics of neuroscience, and may not prog- what underlies self-representation and self-awareness,
we may revise our ethical concepts. This will then affectress as quickly at first, it will be the area with truly
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how we evaluate the ethical implications of neurosci- last few months, we have heard just the first noises of
ence for society. Similarly, engaging in ethical discus- such a dialogue. As Dana Foundation executive director
sions about how to design and interpret neuroscientific Francis Harper aptly noted at the close of NMTF, “You
experiments will affect what we can learn, control, and can call it what you want, but the neuroethics train has
alter about the brain. The conceptual interconnections left the station.”
and feedback between the two main divisions of neuro-
Selected Readingethics are dense enough that it may be that distinctions
between them can only be made roughly, and only in
Open your mind. (2002). The Economist. May 23.
theory.
Safire, W. (2002). The But-What-if Factor. The New York Times.What’s in a Name?
May 16.
As with all newborns, picking a name is a difficult and
Fukuyama, F. (2002). Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the
contentious task. One of the most animated debates at Biotechnology Revolution. (New York: Farrar Straus & Giroux).
the close of the NMTF conference was about the appropri-
Damasio, A.R. (1995). Descartes Error: Emotion, Reason, and the
ateness of the label “Neuroethics.” Some claimed it was Human Brain. (New York: Avon Books).
an unfortunate name for this fledgling field, because ethics Greene, J.D., Sommerville, R.B., Nystrom, L.E., Darley, J.M., and
is the purview of philosophers, while the field clearly Cohen, J.D. (2001). An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement
needs the concerted interaction of policy makers, law- in moral judgment. Science 293, 2105–2108.
yers, journalists, and the public, as well as the philo- Phelps, E.A. (2001). Faces and races in the brain. Nat. Neurosci. 4,
775–776.sophers and neuroscientists. Others suggested that
“Neuroethics” was ill-chosen because ethics excluded
nonethicist philosophers and other humanists. I dis-
agree on both counts. “Neuroethics” is a name well-
chosen for a number of reasons. First, it is concise,
catchy, and evocative. Second, it is a sad misconception
of all too many that ethics is merely an academic exer-
cise of philosophers. Rather, our ability to think and act
ethically is arguably one of the defining things of what
it is to be human: it is an inclusive rather than an exclu-
sive term. Part of what it is to be a scientist, a doctor,
a lawyer, a politician, or a journalist is to execute one’s
office in accordance with the values of one’s profession
and the society at large. Witness the Hippocratic oath,
the courtroom oath, the swearing in before taking office,
and the injunction not to fabricate stories or data. Ethics
should therefore not be a domain foreign to nonethicist
professionals. Moreover, in the time of Plato and Aris-
totle, it was considered imperative for every citizen to
have a moral education and to take part in the ethical
deliberations of society. It is perhaps reflective of some
of the ills in our society that ethics is thought to be a
philosopher’s concern and not the common man’s. But
this is not a misconception we should yield to—it is an
invitation to reeducate the public that ethics is a forum
that needs the participation of everyone. Rather than
capitulate to a narrow view of what ethics is and who
it concerns, we should embrace the dialectical model
of the NMTF meeting and demonstrate that ethics is as
broad and inclusive a category as any.
We should not merely pay lip-service to this inclu-
siveness. Neuroethics has the potential to be an interdis-
ciplinary field with wide-ranging effects. However, be-
cause it ultimately impinges on the well-being of the
individual and our society, it is not a study that can or
should be undertaken in the ivory tower. It is imperative
that neuroethicists take part in a dialogue with the pub-
lic. To make this possible, however, it is important in
the short term to strive for “neuroliteracy” of the public
and the media. We must make a concerted effort to
make the subtleties of neuroscientific research accessi-
ble to the lay public via the media and refrain from the
current practice of feeding it sound bites. For it is only
with a nuanced understanding of the science, and a
renewed trust in the goals of neuroscientists, that real
progress will be made on these difficult issues. In the
